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Subject Matter Jurisdiction of a State Court to Adjudicate the
Merits of a Federal Tax Assessment: In P. C. Monday Tea Co. v.
Milwaukee County Expressway Comn'n,' the Expressway Commission
took real estate of the Tea Company by eminent domain, and the
Company appealed the amount of the award to the circuit court;
the Company was adjudicated a bankrupt, and plaintiff Robert W.
Monday became assignee of the interest of the trustee in bank-
ruptcy. The United States applied to be made a party, and filed a
complaint alleging that the Company was liable for withholding
taxes, interest, and penalties which had been assessed, that due
notice had been given and demand made, and that notices of lien
had been filed. The United States filed a Notice of Levy with the
clerk of circuit court stating that it had a lien on all property of Mr.
Monday, and that any money owed to him by the court was levied
on and seized for satisfaction of the tax. After Mr. Monday was
awarded judgment against the Commission, the United States or-
dered the clerk to retain $14,000 pending disposition of the govern-
ment claim, the validity of the assessment to be ". . . determined
by this Court or another court having jurisdiction in the mat-
ter;. .-2
In circuit court, Monday filed both an answer to the govern-
ment's complaint and a counterclaim stating he was not personally
liable for a 100% penalty for failure to collect, account for, and pay
to the United States withholding taxes due from P. C. Monday Tea
Company. The United States demurred to the counterclaim, stating
that the counterclaim failed to show that the court had jurisdiction
over the subject matter because sections 7421 and 7422 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.) 3 prohibit suit for the purpose of re-
straining the assessment or collection of any tax or penalty in any
court; the demurrer was sustained and Mr. Monday appealed.
The court determined the issue to be: whether a state court
which has control of a fund on which the United States claims a
lien for unpaid taxes, and against which the United States seeks to
enforce its lien, has jurisdiction to go behind the assessment and
determine the existence or amount of the taxpayer's liability. The
court held that it had no such jurisdiction, and accordingly upheld
the trial court which had sustained the demurrer.
Monday's objections to the assessment raised in his counter-
'29 Wis.2d 372, 139 N.W.2d 26 (1966).
2 Id. at 375, 139 N.W2d at 27.
3 All section references hereafter will be to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
unless otherwise indicated.
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claim alleged no procedural defects, but only questioned the merits
of the grounds for the assessment. In order to consider the merits,
the circuit court must have jurisdiction to determine liability not-
withstanding the determination made by the federal officer who
entered the assessment. The court limited its discussion to subject
matter jurisdiction, and found it unnecessary to consider: (1)
whether the United States Attorney's request that the government
be made a party in order to assert its claim is sufficient consent to
adjudication by the circuit court of its claim based on Monday's
individual liability, or (2) whether service on the clerk of the Notice
of Levy, standing alone is consent to such adjudication.
Generally, the internal revenue system in the United States is
one of self assessment; the taxpayer computes his own tax and
makes a return to the Internal Revenue Service, which may audit
and correct the return and assess a deficiency to the extent the tax
shown on the return is not correctly computed, or may credit or re-
fund any excess paid.4 The Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate
is authorized to make inquiries, determinations, and assessments of
taxes. Assessment is made by recording the liability of the taxpayer
in the office of the Secretary or his delegate.
The Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Secretary of the
Treasury or his delegate to enter into closing agreements with re-
spect to taxes,5 or to compromise any civil or criminal case arising
under internal revenue laws.6 Immediate assessment of a tax or
deficiency is allowed by the Code if the Secretary or his delegate
believes that assessment or collection will be jeopardized by delay.7
When an examination of a return is performed and a deficiency
is found, the taxpayer and the examining agent may agree on the
amount. If they do not agree, the taxpayer is entitled to settlement
conferences at three stages :" (1) the taxpayer may request a district
conference; (2) if he by-passes the district conference or if it does
not conclude in an agreement, he may have an appellate conference
with the Appellate Division, upon filing of a formal protest; (3) if
an agreement is not reached, a "90 day letter" (statutory notice of
deficiency) is issued from which the taxpayer may appeal to the
Tax CourtO Except for jeopardy assessments, and in the case of
bankruptcy, receivership, or certain minor technical exceptions,"
no assessment of income tax deficiencies nor levy or proceeding in
430 Am. JuR. Internal Revenue §134 (1958).
5 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §7121 (a).6 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §7122(a).
7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§6861 et seq.
8 RABKIN AND JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GrFT AND ESTATE TAXATION §71.02B
(1966).
9 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§7421, 6212(a), 6213(a).
10 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §6213 (b).
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a court for its collection may be made, begun, or prosecuted until
the notice has been mailed to the taxpayer, or until expiration of
the period for filing a petition with the Tax Court, or, if a petition
has been filed, until the decision of the Tax Court is final.1 The
Tax Court decision may be reviewed by a Court of Appeals.1 2 The
filing by a taxpayer of an appeal to the Tax Court normally pre-
cludes the government from requiring payment of the tax.13 A lien
arises where a person neglects or refuses to pay any tax, after a
demand is made ;14 it arises at the time the assessment is made, and
continues until liability for the amount assessed is satisfied or be-
comes unenforceable by lapse of time.'5
The Wisconsin court found no federal statute which confers
jurisdiction upon it to determine the validity of federal tax assess-
ments which supports such liens. The Wisconsin court found that
the broad, general policy concerning collection of disputed federal
taxes is the doctrine of pay first-litigate later. The impact of that
doctrine was emphasized to such an extent in Flora v. United States6
that it can hardly be overlooked:
Moreover, throughout the congressional debates are to be
found frequent expressions of the principle that payment of
the full tax was a preconditioned to suit: pay his tax * * * then
* * * file a claim for refund'; 'pay the tax and then sue'; 'a re-
view in the courts after payment of the tax'; 'he may seek court
review, but he must first pay the tax assessed' . . . .17
The so-called "pay first" rule is implemented by section 7421,
which prohibits suits to restrain the assessment or collection of a
federal tax in any court, except where the taxpayer petitions the
Tax Court subsequent to his receipt of the "90 day letter."' 8 In
Mulcahy v. United States,- a 100%r penalty which the government
sought against the responsible officer of a corporation which had
not paid over taxes withheld from employees, was a tax within sec-
tion 7421. A suit may be maintained to enjoin collection of a tax
1130 AM. Jua. Internal Revenue §156 (1958).
12 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §7483.
'3 Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960).
'4 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §6321.
15 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §6322.
16 362 U.S. 145, 159 (1960).
17 Ibid. The court continued its emphasis as follows: ... 'in order to go to court
he must pay his asessment'; 'he must pay it [his assessment] before he can
have a trial in court'; 'pay the tax adjudicated against him, and then com-
mence a suit in a court'; 'pay the tax . . .[t]hen ...sue to get it back'; 'pay-
ing his tax and bringing his suit'; 'first pay his tax and then sue to get it back';
'take his case to the district court-conditioned, of course, upon his paying the
assessment.'" Id. at 159.
'8 See also INT. REv. CODE or 1954, §§6212(a), (c), 6312 (a) for petitioning the
Tax Court.
19 237 F. Supp. 656 (D.C. Tex. 1964).
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where in addition to the illegality of the tax there exist some extra-
ordinary circumstances sufficient to bring the case within some
acknowledged principle of equity jurisprudence ;20 however, such a
suit may not be maintained where the legal remedy of paying the
tax and bringing a refund suit to recover the amount paid is ade-
quate.2 1 The prohibition of suits to restrain the assessment or col-
lection of a federal tax is not inapplicable merely because collection
would cause an irreparable injury, such as ruination of the tax-
payer's enterprise. If section 7421 is to be inapplicable, the inade-
quacy of the legal remedy must be established 2
The Wisconsin court found three exceptions to the rule of pay-
ment before litigation: (1) where there is express authorization to
resort to the Tax Court; (2) where the United States brings an ac-
tion at law to recover judgment for the amount of the tax; and (3)
where the United States brings a suit in federal district court under
section 7403 of the Internal Revenue Code. The first exception is
discussed in an earlier part of this article.
Where the United States brings an action at law to recover
judgment for the amount of the tax, (exception 2) the assessment
is not conclusive, but only presumptive. This exception to the rule
of payment before litigation began in Clinkenbeard v'. United States23
and United States v. Rindskapf.2-
Under section 7403 (exception 3), in any case where there has
been a refusal or neglect to pay a tax or discharge any tax liability,
whether or not levy has been made, a civil action may be filed in the
United States District Court to enforce the tax lien of the United
States or to subject any property of the delinquent taxpayer or in
which he has any interest, to the payment of such tax or liability232
All persons having liens on or claiming any interest in the property
involved are to be made parties to the action.2 6 The court may adju-
dicate all matters involved and finally determine the merits of all
claims to and liens on the property, and may decree sale and dis-
tribution where a claim or interest of the United States is estab-
lished.2 7 In such a proceeding, the United States may have a re-
ceiver appointed 28
In Pipola v. Chico,29 an action brought by the purchasers of real
20 Martin v. Andrews, 283 F.2d 552, 65 A.L.R.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1956).
2130 Ai-. JuR. Internal Revenue §248 (1958).
22 Enochs v. Williams Packing & Nay. Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962).
23 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 65 (1874).
24105 U.S. 418 (1881).
25 INT. REV. CODE OP 1954, §7403 (a).2 6 INT. REV. CODE Or 1954, §7403 (b).
2 7 INT. REV. CODE or 1954, §7403 (c).
2 8 United States v. Kensington S. & D. Corp., 187 F.2d 709, 27 A.L.R.2d 708 (3rd
Cir. 1951).
29 274 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1960).
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property (under section 2410 of the Judicial Code3") to cancel a
Government tax lien against their grantor as erroneously assessed,
the Government successfully challenged the plaintiff's right to go
behind a federal tax lien, on the theory that in Bull v. United States
31
there was dictum stating a grantor could not do so; therefore, neither
should a grantee be permitted to do so. Later, the Government re-
versed its position and concluded that although its victory in Pipola
reached the correct result, the basis of that result should have been
that the taxpayer could contest the assessment, but a transferee
could not.
The right of a taxpayer to attack the merits of a tax assessment
in an action brought against him by the Government under section
7403 was upheld by the Second Circuit in United States v. O'Connor,
32
in a decision which overruled Pipola. The government's change of
position after Pipola was based on the language of section 7403 (c) ;33
however, the court in O'Connor stated that this language settled
nothing because, if as stated in Bull, the assessment had the force
of a judgment except in a proceeding before the Tax Court under
section 6213 or a refund suit under Internal Revenue Code section
742234 and Judicial Code section 1346(a) (1), 35 ". . . 'the merits'
would simply be the procedural regularity of the assessment and
the determination of the property to which the lien attached.
'36
The Second Circuit in O'Connor found that the issue was:
Whether in a suit under §7403 the assessment is conclusive,
as it would be in a summary method of enforcement, or pre-
sumptive but inconclusive as it would be in an action at law
on the assessment or on a bond to secure its payment.
The two early Supreme Court cases of Clinkenbeard37 and Rinds-
kopf, 38 not called to the court's attention in either Bull or Pipola, were
3028 U.S.C. §2410(a) (1965).
31295 U.S. 247 (1935).
32291 F.2d 520, 100 A.L.R.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1961).
33 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §7403 (c) states that the court shall adjudicate all mat-
ters involved in the action and finally determine the merits of all claims to and
liens on the property.
34 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §7422; this section states that there may be no suit
prior to filing a claim for refund, to recover any tax alleged to have been
erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have
been collected without authority.
3528 U.S.C. §1346(a) (1) (1965); this section states that district courts have
original jurisdiction concurrent with the court of claims, of any civil action
against the United States for recovery of any internal revenue tax which the
plaintiff alleges was erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any pen-
alty he claims was collected without authority or any amount he alleges to
have been excessive or wrongfully collected under internal revenue laws. The
jurisdiction limit of $10,000 does not apply on suits to recover taxes.
36 United States v. O'Connor, 291 F.2d 520, 526, 100 A.L.R.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1961).
37 Clinkenbeard v. United States, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 65 (1874).
38 United States v. Rindskopf, 105 U.S. 418 (1881).
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noted by the O'Connor court as holding that when the Government
sues on a bond to secure payment of an assessment, the legality of
the assessment is open for judicial determination. Thus, it was con-
cluded that when the Government seeks the aid of the courts, it
opens the assessment of scrutiny.39 The court found further support
for its conclusion in the history of the legislation; it was noted that
section 7424, which concerns civil actions by third persons to clear
title to property, expressly provides that the assessment upon which
the lien of the United States is based is conclusively presumed
valid, and that both section 7403 and section 7424 were once parts
of Revised Statutes, section 3207, but that the conclusive presump-
tion part of section 7424 was absent from section 7403. In 1954, when
the House Committee added a provision to section 7403 which
made the merits of the assessment conclusive, the Senate Commit-
tee eliminated the amendment.40 This fact was considered insignifi-
cant in Pipola, as the Senate stated that its deletion was not intended
to change the existing law.41 In O'Connor, the court reconsidered
the deletion, and found that it had considerably greater impact than
had been accorded to it in Pipola.
The O'Connor rule, regarding section 7403, has come under criti-
cism. 42 The conclusion that the merits of the Government's claim
may be adjudicated in a section 7403 suit seems inconsistent with the
congressional policy of summary tax collection.43 Yet, subsequent cases
have upheld the O'Connor conclusion. 44
Section 2410(a) of the Judicial Code45 authorizes the naming of
the United States as a party in any quiet title or foreclosure action
in any district court or in any state court having subject matter
jurisdiction, where the United States claims a mortgage or other
lien on the property involved. In 1960, the Pipola46 case, held that
the court could not inquire into the merits of an assessment in a
suit under section 2410; however, in 1961, this holding was dis-
avowed in O'Connor,47 casting doubt on whether or not the merits
are closed in a section 2410 proceeding.48 In Cooper Agency, Inc. v.
39 "We think the closer analogy is to the action at law on the assessment; when
the Government seeks the aid of the courts in enforcing the assessment in any
form it opens the assessment to judicial scrutiny in all respects." United States
v. O'Connor, 291 F.2d 520, 527, 100 A.L.R2d 858 (2d Cir. 1961).
40H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A431 (1954).
41 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 610 (1954).
42 Note, 71 YALE L. J. 1329 (1962).
43 Further arguments are contained Id. at 1336.
"4 Quinn v. Hook, 231 F.Supp. 718, 721 (E.D. Pa. 1964) ; United States v. Lease,
346 F.2d 696, 698 (2d Cir. 1965).
4528 U.S.C. §2410(a) (1965).46 Pipola v. Chico, 274 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1960).
47 United States v. O'Connor, 291 F.2d 520, 100 A.L.R. 858 (2d Cir. 1961).4 8 Note, 71 YALE L. J. 1329 (1962).
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McLeod,49 a suit was brought by transferees to enjoin the United States
from taking action to enforce collection of jeopardy assessments and to
have the assessments and lien declared invalid. In granting the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss, the court stated that the intent of the court
in O'Connor in overruling Pipola was not to allow inquiry into the
merits of an assessment in an action under section 2410, and that
Pipola was overruled only because it was based on a faulty premise,
and not because it reached an erroneous conclusion.50 Several other
cases have since reached the same conclusion. 51
In the recent case of Falik v. United States,12 the Second Circuit
held that section 2410 was not intended to overturn the longstanding
principle that, except in certain exceptional cases with respect to deter-
minations of deficiencies of income, gift, and estate tax by the Tax
Court,53 a person whose sole claim is that a federal tax assessment was
not well grounded in fact and law must pay first and litigate later. The
court noted that an action to remove a tax lien as a cloud on a tax-
payer's title was not maintainable because it was, in effect, not a suit
for an injunction to restrain assessment or collection of tax, and there-
fore forbidden by section 7421 (a). Such action is similar to that con-
templated by the Declaratory Judgment Act 54 to which Congress at-
tached an exception with respect to federal taxes, and to allow mainte-
nance of such an action would constitute a radical departure from the
long-continued policy of Congress.
The Wisconsin court, in Monday, cited section 610 of the Restate-
ment of Conflicts and found an anomaly in a state court deciding the
issue of an individual's liability under tax laws of the United States.
Although the Restatement stated that "No action can be maintained by
a foreign state to enforce its license, or revenue laws, or claims for
taxes," 55 the 1948 Supplement to the Restatement deleted this statement,
added a caveat that no opinion was expressed on whether an action
could be maintained by a foreign state on a claim for taxes, and added
49 235 F.Supp. 276 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
50 Id. at 284.
51 Quinn v. Hook, 231 F.Supp. 718 (E.D. Pa. 1964) ; Broadwell v. United States,
234 F.Supp. 17, 18 (No. Car. 1964) ; Seff v. Machiz, 246 F.Supp. 823 (E.D. So.
Car. 1965) ; McCann v. United States, 248 F.Supp. 585, 587 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
52 343 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1965).
53 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §6213.
54 28 U.S.C. §2201 (1965). The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934 was
amended by section 405 of the Revenue Act of 1935 to exclude federal tax dis-
putes. The Senate report (S.Rep. No. 1240, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.) explained
that the Act has no application to federal taxes because its application thereto
"... would constitute a radical departure from the long continued policy of
Congress with respect to the determination, assessment, and collection of Fed-
eral taxes." The court in Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 164 (1960)
stated: "It is clear enough that one 'radical departure' which was averted by
the amendment was the potential circumvention of the 'pay first and litigate
later' rule by way of suits for declaratory judgments in tax cases."
55 RESTATEMENT, CoNFLIcrs OF LAW, §610 (1934).
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that if a position were taken now it would seem desirable to hold con-
trary to the original view.
It was noted by the court that Mr. Monday cited the Texas case
of Paddock v. Siernoneit,5 8 in which a state court decided a dispute over
liability of a taxpayer for federal taxes where the United States had
intervened in a state action for personal judgment for the penalty and
foreclosure of its lien. The State court decided the case without dis-
cussing its power to do so. The Wisconsin case of Estate of Olson,5 7
not cited in the principal case, was similar to the Texas case. Olson died
in December, 1953, and in connection with the probate of his estate,
the District Director of Internal Revenue filed a claim for additional
taxes owed by Olson and the administrator filed objections. The trial
court's decision for the Government was upheld on appeal, and, again,
the issue of jurisdiction of a state court to determine the validity of
a federal tax lien on its merits was never raised.
The Wisconsin court found that Monday's counterclaim was sus-
ceptible to either of two interpretations, but that the same conclusion
resulted either way. (1) If treated as a complaint in an action to quiet
title to the fund held by the court, the federal assessment would be
conclusive under the rule promulgated in Falik. (2) If viewed as a
defensive pleading, and this is more realistic, the question would be
whether the enactments and doctrines of the federal scheme of tax
collection impliedly exclude state court jurisdiction to set aside assess-
ments of federal taxes. The court refused to apply the O'Connor doc-
trine relating to section 7403 to a suit brought in a state court, and
concluded that state courts are, in fact, impliedly excluded from such
jurisdiction.
"Congressional policy," said the Wisconsin court in Monday, "ap-
pears to favor adjudication in such [tax] disputes in federal courts
after payment of the tax assessed. We conclude, therefore, that the
state courts are not to adjudicate them, at least in the situation present
here."58 This statement set the tone for the majority's reasoning through-
out the case; the court seemed to be rather unsure of its footing, and
repeatedly restricted its decision to the facts of the case before it.
In form, the decision limited its conclusion that a state has no subject
matter jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes over the merits of a federal
tax assessment to the facts of the present case-where the court is
holding a fund on which the Government claims a tax lien; however,
a review of the court's reasoning points to a far different effect.
The Wisconsin court made an important addition to the O'Connor
rule; it has found that although O'Connor made no statement expressly
56 147 Tex. 571, 218 S.W.2d 428, 7 A.L.R.2d 1062 (1949).
5 271 Wis. 199, 72 N.W.2d 717 (1955).
58 P. C. Monday Tea Co. v. Milwaukee County Expressway Comm'n., 29 Wis.2d
372, 382, 139 N.W.2d 26, 32 (1966).
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restricting its holding to an action in a federal court, the particular
action involved was in a federal court and was brought there pursuant
to a federal statute. Thus, the Wisconsin court held that while a federal
court may have the power to adjudicate the merits of a federal tax as-
sessment in a suit brought to enforce the lien of the United States,
a state court has no such power. The court found an implied exclusion
of state court jurisdiction, at least where the United States is demand-
ing payment out of a fund in the control of the state court; such im-
plication arose from the general rule of pay first-litigate later, and the
anomaly which would exist if a state court had the power to review
administrative decisions of a federal officer. The court further pointed
out that it would also be anomalous for a state court to decide an in-
dividual's liability to the United States under federal tax laws, and in
granting power to a state court to review administrative decisions of
a federal officer in his application of federal laws. The duty of state
courts to give full recognition to laws of the United States ". . . does
not compel the conclusion that Congress intended state courts to have
jurisdiction to determine disputes over liability for federal taxes.15 9
The Wisconsin court pointed out, and rightfully so, that the Declara-
tory judgment Act expressly excepts all tax disputes. Furthermore, the
court cited Falik0 in noting that in an action brought under section
2410 of the Judicial Code, for quiet title or foreclosure actions, a court
has no jurisdiction to go behind a tax assessment and determine its val-
idity. It also pointed out that congressional policy favors payment be-
fore litigation unless resort is made to the Tax Court, and that there
is no federal statute conferring jurisdiction on a state court to determine
the merits of a federal tax assessment. Thus, while the court, by its
express language, limited its holding to the facts before it, it has, by
implication, concluded that a state court has no subject matter jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate disputes over liability for federal taxes in virtually
all situations. In light of this conclusion, it seems that the only reason
for deciding the tax assessment on its merits in the Olson case was that
the issue of jurisdiction was never raised.
The court was apparently reluctant to hold that a state court has
jurisdiction to determine the validity of a federal tax lien on its merits,
without express authority from Congress or at least some federal court;
even the open door of the O'Connor case was insufficient to persuade
the court that it had such power, though O'Connor set down a broad
principle which did not expressly exclude state courts. Section 7403 of
the Internal Revenue Code, cited in O'Connor, expressly speaks of,
bringing a suit in a federal district court, but does not exclude bringing
a suit in a state court. The conclusion that the statute limits suits to/
59 Ibid.
0 Falik v. United States, 343 F2d 38 (2d Cir. 1965).
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enforce a tax lien to federal courts, is apparently not as clear-cut as it
would appear on the surface, for Justice Hallows, in his dissent in
Monday, stated that he believed the O'Connor rule applies to state
courts as well as federal courts. Justice Hallows also found no implied
exclusion of a state court's jurisdiction, as the majority did, nor any
anomaly in according to the Wisconsin court the power to decide this
issue. He argued that the United States sought this result when it ap-
plied to the state court for enforcement of a lien against money in its
custoiy 61
Actually, the holding of the majority seems reasonable in light of
the federal statutes and the apparent anomaly of a state court over-
riding a federal officer's determination based on federal law. Should
Justice Hallows' view be adopted, additional problems would arise con-
cerning the extent of a state court's jurisdiction; for example: would
jurisdiction be limited to those cases in which the court held assets of
the taxpayer? In any event, it appears that it will take a federal statute
or at least a federal court decision stating expressly that a state court
has the power to determine the validity of a federal tax assessment on
its merits before Justice Hallows' view is followed in Wisconsin.
MARTIN J. KURzER
Diversity Jurisdiction: Erie Amenability of a Foreign Corpora-
tion to Federal Court Derivative Suit: In Lapides v. Doner' a mi-
nority stockholder of the DWG Cigar Corporation, incorporated in
Ohio, and three of the corporate directors brought a diversity derivative
suit in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michi-
gan against five directors and the corporation seeking a declaration that
resolutions adopted at a meeting of the board of directors were void.
The resolutions included the replacement of the plaintiffs with the
individual defendants on the board of directors and the executive
committee.
Since under Wojtczak v. American United Ins. Co.,2 the Michigan
courts would not assume jurisdiction over an action involving the
exercise of control or management of the internal affairs of a foreign
corporation, the case hinged on whether the Erie3 doctrine, as developed
by later cases4 required the district court to apply the Michigan rule.
Thus, the ultimate problem was whether the Michigan rule, as expressed
61 P. C. Monday Tea Co. v. Milwaukee County Expressway Comm'n., 29 Wis.2d
372, 383, 139 N.W.2d 26, 32 (1966).
1248 F.Supp. 883 (1965).2293 Mich. 449, 292 N.W. 364 (1940).
3 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), Federal Courts in diversity
matters must apply the substantive law of the state wherein the cause of action
occurred, and federal procedural law.
4 Guaranty Trust Co., v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) ; Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Electric Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
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